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OBSERVING, REPORTING, AND DECIDING IN
NETWORKS OF SENTENCES
H. JEROME KEISLER AND JEFFREY M. KEISLER
Abstract. In prior work [7] we considered networks of agents who have
knowledge bases in first order logic, and report facts to their neighbors
that are in their common languages and are provable from their knowledge bases, in order to help a decider verify a single sentence. In report
complete networks, the signatures of the agents and the links between
agents are rich enough to verify any decider’s sentence that can be proved
from the combined knowledge base. This paper introduces a more general setting where new observations may be added to knowledge bases
and the decider must choose a sentence from a set of alternatives. We
consider the question of when it is possible to prepare in advance a finite plan to generate reports within the network. We obtain conditions
under which such a plan exists and is guaranteed to produce the right
choice under any new observations.

1. Introduction
This paper builds upon the paper [7]. In that paper, a signature network is a network of agents each labeled with a signature. Each agent has a
knowledge base within its signature. Unless otherwise stated, all signatures
and sentences are understood to be in first order logic. Agents with different
but overlapping first order signatures may arise, for example, in an organization where the agents are experts in different areas of specialization, or in
distributed networks where a large problem is broken up into small problems
to be addressed by agents. A sentence in the language of an agent x is said
to be report provable at x if x can verify D after the agents in the network
report sentences to their neighbors in their common languages. A signature
network is said to be report complete at x if whatever the agent knowledge
bases are, every consequence of the union of these knowledge bases that is
in the language of x is report provable at x. To obtain conditions for report
completeness, the Craig interpolation theorem [4] is applied at each edge in
the network.
The present paper considers situations that may arise in applications
where there is some systematic relationship among the possible knowledge
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bases and decision sentences. Specifically, we consider “observation networks” on a given signature network in which there are many potential observations that may be added to the underlying knowledge bases (i.e., learning), and a finite set of alternative sentences one of which must be proved
(i.e., making a decision). We exploit the fact that report completeness holds
for every knowledge base over a report complete signature network. We do
this by introducing the notion of a “report plan” for an observation network
— a finite scheme for finding a “report proof” for one of the alternative
sentences once observations are added to the underlying knowledge bases.
A report plan is decentralized; the agents only need to know their own observations and the reports they receive, not what happens elsewhere in the
network. After the observations are made, a report plan is executed by a
single pass through the network.
We give a brief preview in Section 2 and a summary of some facts from
the literature in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss single- and multiple-pass
report proofs, and in Sections 5 and 6 we introduce the central notions of an
observation network and a report plan. Our main result, Theorem 7.3, shows
that an observation network will always have a report plan for a given finite
set of alternatives provided that: (1) the observation network is sufficient
for selecting from the set of alternatives, and (2) the underlying signature
network contains a signature tree in the sense of the paper [7]. We also
prove two results that are complementary to our main theorem. Theorem
5.6 is a “finiteness theorem” that shows that if an observation network is
sufficient for selecting from a given infinite set of alternatives, then some
finite part of the observation network is sufficient for selecting from some
finite subset of the alternatives. Theorem 7.1 shows that a report plan
guarantees that under every possible family of observations by the agents,
some alternative has a single-pass report proof. In Proposition 8.5 we briefly
indicate a way that report plans might be applied to obtain approximate
values for unknown quantities depending on observations. At the end of the
paper we give a list of open questions.
2. Preview
Before we formally define the main concepts in this paper, we give in
Figure 1 a simple example that may help the reader to fix ideas. We will
refer back to this example later on in this paper. In this example there are
five agents arranged in a network as shown in the first picture. At the top is
an agent d (the decider) who must decide between the two sentences A, ¬A
(indicated by a question mark). Agents y and z may report to w, agent
z may also report to x, and agents w and x may report to d. Each agent
is equipped with a set of sentences called its knowledge base. In addition,
each agent has a set of potential observations that it might make. Before any
observations are made, a report plan is prepared as in the picture. This plan
gives a set of sentences that might be reported along each edge of the graph.
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Figure 1. A Report Plan

Each agent will make one of its potential observations, independently of
the other agents. Then the report plan is executed, building what we call a
report proof. This is done with a single pass through the network, beginning
at the bottom and ending at the top. Since four agents each have two
potential observations, there are 16 possible cases where each agent makes
an observation. One such case is shown in the last picture. Beginning at
the bottom level, for each edge (r, s) in the graph, agent r proves a sentence
from its knowledge base and observation and any sentences reported to it,
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and reports it to agent s. This sentence must be in the common language
of the pair of agents involved. Finally, the decider d at the top is able to
prove one of the alternatives, which happens to be ¬A in this case.
We will now formally develop the ideas illustrated in the above example
and obtain our results. A central feature is that agents report sentences to
other agents in their common language. These sentences are Craig interpolants. Our arguments in this paper will apply results from the paper [7]
that in turn depend on the Craig interpolation theorem.
3. Prerequisites
3.1. Logic. We assume familiarity with the notions of sentence, signature,
and proof in first order logic with equality. For background, see [2] or [6].
The set of all first order sentences in a signature L is denoted by [L]. First
order logic is formulated so that the true sentence > and false sentence ⊥
belong to [L] for every signature L. The notation K ` B means that the
sentence B is provable from the set of sentences K, and ` B means that B is
provable. A set of sentences K is consistent
if it is not the case that K ` ⊥.
W
Given a V
finite set B of sentences, B is the disjunction of the sentences in
B, and B is the conjunction of the sentences in B. The conjunction
of the empty set of sentences is >, and the disjunction of the empty set
is ⊥. We use B → D as an abbreviation for ¬B ∨ D, and B ↔ D for
(B → D) ∧ (D → B). Given a signature L and a set of sentences K ⊆ [L], a
complete (or maximal consistent) extension of K (in L) is a set of sentences
M such that K ⊆ M ⊆ [L], M is consistent, and for each B ∈ [L], either
B ∈ M or (¬B) ∈ M. We will use the Compactness Theorem in the
following form: A set of sentences K is consistent if and only if every finite
subset of K is consistent.
3.2. Graphs. By a (simple) directed graph (V, E) we mean a non-empty
finite set V of vertices, and a set E ⊆ V × V of edges (or arcs) (x, y) such
that x 6= y. (We do not allow more than one edge from a vertex x to a
vertex y, we do not allow edges from a vertex to itself, and we distinguish
between the pair (x, y) and the pair (y, x).) When (x, y) ∈ E, we will say
that x is a child of y and that y is a parent of x.
A (directed) path of length n from x to y is a sequence (x0 , . . . , xn )
of pairwise distinct vertices such that x0 = x, xn = y, and for each i < n,
(xi , xi+1 ) ∈ E. (In particular, for each vertex x, (x) is a path of length 0
from x to itself.) A source is a vertex x such that there is no edge (z, x) ∈ E,
and a sink is a vertex x such that there is no edge (x, y) ∈ E.
In a directed graph, by a decider we mean a vertex d such that for every
other vertex x, there is at least one path from x to d. By a pointed graph
we mean a directed graph (V, E) with at least one decider. Hereafter we will
always assume that (V, E) is a pointed graph. We will always use the symbol
d to denote a decider for (V, E). Note that we assume there is at least one
decider, but allow the possibility that there is more than one decider.
4

A directed cycle of length n is a sequence (x0 , . . . , xn−1 , xn ) of vertices
such that (x0 , . . . , xn−1 ) is a directed path, xn = x0 , and (xn−1 , xn ) ∈ E
(hence n ≥ 2).
By a directed acyclic graph we mean a pointed graph with no directed
cycles. A directed acyclic graph has a unique decider, which is also the
unique sink. In a directed acyclic graph, for every vertex x there is a path
from a source to x.
By a tree we will mean a directed acyclic graph (V, E) such that for every
vertex x there is at most one (x, y) ∈ E. In a tree, for every vertex x there
is a unique path from x to the decider.
By a connected symmetric graph (or connected undirected graph) we
mean a pointed graph (V, E) such that whenever (x, y) ∈ E we also have
(y, x) ∈ E. In a connected symmetric graph, every vertex is a decider.
3.3. Signature and Knowledge Base Networks. We now review some
notions that we will need from the paper [7]. We attach signatures and
knowledge bases to the vertices of pointed graphs. From now on we will call
the vertices agents.
A signature network on (V, E) is an object
S = (V, E, L(·))
where (V, E) is a pointed graph with a labeling L(·) thatSassigns a first
order signature L(x) to each agent x ∈ V . We let L(V ) = x∈V L(x), and
call L(V ) the combined signature. We say that a symbol S occurs at a
vertex x if S ∈ L(x).
We say that a signature network S contains a signature network T =
(V, F, L(·)) if S and T have the same agents and signatures, and (V, F ) can
be obtained from (V, E) by removing edges.
Let T = (V, F, L(·)) be a signature network. We say that T is a signature
tree if:
(1) (V, F ) is a tree;
(2) for every pair of agents x, y ∈ V and symbol S that occurs at both
x and y, there is a vertex z ∈ V such that S occurs at every vertex
on a path from x to z and at every vertex on a path from y to z.
Note that Condition (2) allows the possibility that z = x or z = y.
Condition (2) occurs frequently in the literature, under the name “running
intersection property” (e.g. see [3], [5]).
The example shown in Figure 1 in the Preview at the beginning of this
paper is a knowledge base over a signature network S that contains the
signature tree T shown in Figure 2. T is obtained from S by removing the
edge (z, x).
A knowledge base is a set of first order sentences. Given a signature
network S = (V, E, L(·)), a knowledge base over S (or knowledge base
network over S) is an object
K = (V, E, L(·), K(·))
5
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Figure 2. A Signature Network and Tree
where K(·) is a labeling that assigns
S a knowledge base K(x) ⊆ [L(x)] to each
agent x ∈ V . We write K(V ) = x∈V K(x), and we call the set K(V ) the
combined knowledge base.
Note that in a knowledge base K over S, each symbol that occurs in a
sentence in K(x) must belong to L(x), but we allow the possibility that L(x)
also has additional symbols.
If a signature network S = (V, E, L(·)) contains a signature network T =
(V, F, L(·)), then for any knowledge base K over S we get a knowledge base
KT over T by replacing E by F and leaving everything else unchanged.
3.4. Report Provability. We summarize the concept of report provability
and some related facts from [1] and [7].
Definition 3.1. Let
K = (V, E, L(·), K(·))
be a knowledge base over a signature network S.
reportable in K along an edge (x, y) if

A sentence C is 0-

C ∈ [L(x) ∩ L(y)] and K(x) ` C.
C is (n + 1)-reportable in K along an edge (x, y) if
C ∈ [L(x) ∩ L(y)] and K(x) ∪ R ` C,
where R is a set of sentences each of which is n-reportable along some edge
(z, x).
The word “reportable” means “n-reportable for some n”, and “reportable
to x” means “reportable along (z, x) for some z”.
Given a decider d for S, a sentence D ∈ [L(d)] is report provable in K
at d if D is provable from K(d) and a set R of sentences each of which is
reportable to d in K.
This means that at each stage, for each edge (x, y), agent x can report
to agent y a sentence C in their common language, where C is provable
from the knowledge base K(x) and sentences reported to x at earlier stages.
6

Finally, D is provable from the knowledge base K(d) and sentences reported
to d. Thus the sentence D is established using only proofs within the languages [L(x)] of single agents x, and communications along edges (x, y) in
the common language [L(x) ∩ L(y)].
The next fact shows that report provability implies provability.
Fact 3.2. (Lemma 2.6 in [7]) Suppose d is a decider and a sentence D ∈
[L(d)] is report provable at d in a knowledge base network K. Then D is
provable from the combined knowledge base, K(V ) ` D.
Definition 3.3. A knowledge base network K is report complete at a
decider d if every sentence D ∈ [L(d)] that is provable from the combined
knowledge base K(V ) is report provable in K at d. A signature network S is
report complete at a decider d if every knowledge base K over S is report
complete at d.
The paper [7] deals with the following two questions. Which signature
networks are report complete at d? Which signature networks contain a
signature tree at a decider d?
Fact 3.4. (Amir and McIlraith [1]) Every signature tree S is report complete
at its unique decider.
Corollary 3.5. Every signature network S that contains a signature tree T
with decider d is report complete at d.
Proof. Let K be a knowledge base over S. An easy induction shows that for
each edge (x, y) in T, every sentence that is n-reportable along (x, y) in KT
is n-reportable along (x, y) in K. By Fact 3.4, KT is report complete at d,
so K is also report complete at d.

Fact 3.6. (Theorem 5.3 in [7]). Let S be a signature network on a directed
acyclic graph and let d be its decider. S is report complete at d if and only
if S contains a signature tree with decider d.
Fact 3.7. (Lemma 9.1 in [7]) Let S be a signature network on a connected
symmetric graph. If for some agent x, S contains a signature tree with
decider x, then for every agent y, S contains a signature tree with decider
y.
Fact 3.8. (Theorem 9.7 in [7]). Let S be a signature network on a connected
symmetric graph and let d ∈ V . S is report complete at d if and only if S
contains a signature tree with decider d.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, Theorem 7.3 will show that report
plans at d always exist under the hypothesis that S is a signature network
that contains a signature tree with decider d, like the example shown in the
Preview. Facts 3.6—3.8 above show that this hypothesis is satisfied at d
whenever S is over either a directed acyclic or a connected symmetric graph
and is report complete at d. For this reason, we expect that the hypothesis
7

will often be met in applications. Moreover, as noted in [7], the results hold
not only for first order logic but for any logic that satisfies the compactness
and Craig interpolation theorems and is closed under the Boolean connectives. In applications, signature networks that contain signature trees might
also arise in various ways as a design goal. One possibility is suggested by
an algorithm (called cut-cycles) in the paper [1] showing that for every signature network over a connected symmetric graph and every agent d, one
can obtain a signature tree with decider d by removing edges and minimally
adding symbols to signatures.
Our results in this paper deal with the situation where an agent x in a
network receives reports from other agents and is faced with a decision or a
family of related decisions. We have found it to be convenient to concentrate
on the case that x is a decider, that is, for every agent y in the directed graph
there is a path from y to x. But even if the agent x who is faced with a
decision is not a decider in the directed graph, the results in this paper can
still be applied in a slightly different manner. In that case, one can proceed
as follows.
For the moment, we work with an arbitrary directed graph (V, E) which
does not necessarily have a decider, and define the notions of a knowledge
base network and report provability over (V, E) as before. For any signature
network S over (V, E), knowledge base K over S, and agent x ∈ V , one can
always build a new directed graph (Vx , Ex ), and a new signature network
Sx over (Vx , Ex ) and knowledge base Kx over Sx such that:
• x is a decider in (Vx , Ex );
• S contains a signature tree with decider x if and only if Sx contains
a signature tree with decider x;
• a sentence is report provable at x in K if and only if it is report
provable at x in Kx .
All the results for the case where an agent x is a decider can be applied to
the general situation where an arbitrary agent x is faced with a decision by
passing to (Vx , Ex ), Sx , and Kx .
The idea in building (Vx , Ex ) is to ignore the agents z such that there is
no path from z to x. Given a directed graph (V, E) and agent x ∈ V , let
Vx be the set of all agents y such that (V, E) contains a path from y to x,
and let Ex = E ∩ (Vx × Vx ). It is clear that x is a decider in (Vx , Ex ). Now,
for any signature network S over (V, E) and knowledge base K over S, let
Sx and Kx be the restrictions of S and K to (Vx , Ex ). The properties listed
above for Sx and Kx are easily verified by observing that there are no paths
from agents in V \ Vx to agents in Vx .
We now return to our original setting where (V, E) is always taken to
be a pointed graph, and thus has at least one decider. While our main
results will be about signature networks that contain signature trees, many
of the examples in the following pages will have signature networks that
8

do not contain signature trees, in order to illustrate the need for various
assumptions in our results.
4. Single and Multiple Pass Report Proofs
The paper [7] introduced the notion of report provability, but refrained
from introducing a notion of a report proof. In this section we introduce
a kind of report proof. We will use this notion to explain what is meant
by report provability by a single pass through the network, and give some
examples where multiple passes are needed. Later on, in Section 6, we will
develop the notion of a report plan, which is a plan that guarantees report
provability by a single pass for a whole family of related knowledge base
networks.
Informally, a report proof will consist of finitely many “reporting steps”
denoted by (x, y, C) where an agent x reports a sentence C to a parent
y, followed by one “deciding step” denoted by (x, x, D) where an agent x
decides on a sentence D. In a reporting step (x, y, C), the reporting agent x
first proves the sentence C from its knowledge base and the sentences that
have been previously reported to x, and then reports C to y. In the deciding
step, x proves D from its knowledge base and the sentences that have been
reported to x. Here is the formal definition.
Definition 4.1. By a report proof of a sentence D at a decider d in a
knowledge base network K we mean a finite sequence
R = (x1 , y1 , C1 )(x2 , y2 , C2 ) · · · (xk , yk , Ck )
of edges labeled by sentences such that:
• For each i < k we have (xi , yi ) ∈ E;
• xk = yk = d and Ck = D;
• for each i ≤ k, Ci ∈ [L(xi )∩L(yi )] and Ci is provable from K(xi )∪R
where R is the set of sentences previously reported to xi in R, i.e.,
R = {Cj : j < i and yj = xi }
A report proof has a single pass between ` and m if the edges (xi , yi ), ` ≤
i ≤ m are distinct, and for each agent x ∈ V , the i’s such that ` ≤ i ≤ m
and x = xi are consecutive.
A report proof has ≤ n passes if it can be broken up into at most n
consecutive single passes.
K is n-pass report complete at d if every sentence in [L(d)] that is
provable from K(V ) has a report proof with ≤ n passes in K. A signature
network S is n-pass report complete at d if every knowledge base network
K over S is.
Remark 4.2. If there exists a report proof of D at d in K, then D is report
provable at d in K.
9

Proof. Let R = (x1 , y1 , C1 ) · · · (xk , yk , Ck ) be a report proof of D at d in K.
Then (xk , yk , Ck ) = (d, d, D). An easy induction shows that for each m < k,
Cm is (m − 1)-reportable along (xm , ym ) in K. It follows that D is report
provable at d in K.

Later on, we will show that the converse of Remark 4.2 is also true. First,
we give some examples.
Example 4.3. Look again at Figure 1 in the Preview of this paper. In the
picture labeled “A Report Proof” at the lower right, a knowledge base KO is
formed by adding each agent’s observations to its original knowledge base:
KO (d)
KO (w)
KO (x)
KO (y)
KO (z)

=
=
=
=
=

{D → A} ∪ {>},
{W → B, ¬W → E} ∪ {W },
{X ↔ (A ↔ E)} ∪ {X},
{Y → (B → C), ¬Y → (B → D)} ∪ {Y },
{C → (Z ↔ E)} ∪ {¬Z}.

The lower right picture shows the following single-pass report proof of ¬A
at d in KO , working from the bottom of the network to the top:
(y, w, B → C)(z, w, C → ¬E)(w, d, ¬E)(x, d, A ↔ E)(d, d, ¬A).
That is, y reports B → C to w, then z reports C → ¬E to w, then w reports
¬E to d, then x reports A ↔ E to d, and finally, d decides on ¬A.
We now give some examples of signature networks that are not single-pass
report complete at a decider d. As we will see in Proposition 4.9 below, such
a signature network cannot contain a signature tree with decider d. When
S has a unique decider d, we sometimes omit the phrase “at d”; for instance,
we may write “report complete” instead of “report complete at d”.
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Figure 3. Example 4.4
Example 4.4. The signature network S shown in Figure 3 has a unique decider d and is two-pass report complete but not single-pass report complete.
The knowledge base network K1 over S is single-pass report complete, but
the knowledge base network K over S is not.
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Proof. It is clear that S cannot contain a signature tree, because one would
have to remove the edge (w, x), and then condition (2) in the definition of a
signature tree would fail for the pair (x, z) and the symbol A. To prove that
S is two-pass report complete at d, let K0 be an arbitrary signature network
0
over S, let D ∈ [L(d)] = {>, ⊥, B, ¬B},
V 0 and suppose K (V ) ` D. For each
agent u, let Ku be the conjunction K (u). Then
Kz ∧ Kw ∧ Kx ` Ky → [Kd → D].
Therefore D has the following two-pass the report proof, with the passes
separated by a semicolon:
(z, w, Kz )(w, x, Kz ∧ Kw )(x, y, Ky → [Kd → D])(y, z, Kd → D);
(z, w, Kd → D)(w, d, Kd → D)(d, d, D).
K1 : We have K1 (V ) = {A, B}. The only non-trivial sentence D ∈ [L(d)]
such that {A, B} ` D is B. B has the single-pass report proof
(x, y, B)(y, z, B)(z, w, B)(w, d, B)(d, d, B).
K: We show that K is not single-pass report complete. We have
K(V ) = {A, A → B, >} ` B,
so there exists a report proof R of B at d in K. Let us call a step (xn , yn , Cn )
in R significant if the sentence Cn is not logically equivalent to >. By
working back from the end, one can see from the diagram that R must
contain significant steps along the following edges in reverse order:
(w, d), (z, w), (y, z), (x, y), (w, x), (z, w).
Therefore R cannot be a single-pass report proof, and in fact, R must contain
more than one significant step along the edge (z, w).

Here is an example that requires more than two passes.
Example 4.5. The signature network S shown in Figure 4 has the unique
decider d, and is three-pass report complete but not two-pass report complete. In the knowledge base K, the sentence C is report provable in three
passes but not in two passes. C has a three-pass report proof in K with only
one step along each edge.
Using the same idea with a chain of n triangles, we can construct a signature network that is (n + 1)-pass report complete but not n-pass report
complete at its unique decider.
In our next example, the signature network is three-pass report complete,
but is not two-pass report complete because a single agent must act at three
different times during a report proof.
Example 4.6. In the knowledge base network K shown in Figure 5, the
sentence C has the following three-pass report proof at d:
(w, x, A)(x, y, B)(y, w, B); (w, u, B)(u, v, C)(v, w, C); (w, d, C)(d, d, C),
11
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but does not have a two-pass report proof at d because any report proof
must contain a sequence of significant steps along the above edges.
The same idea with n triangles attached to w will give a signature network
in which w must act more than n times in a report proof.
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Here is an example of a knowledge base network that is report complete
but there is no n such that it is n-pass report complete. However, the underlying signature network is not report complete. The analogous question
for signature networks (Question 9.1) is open.
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Example 4.7. In Figure 6, A(·) and B(·) are unary predicate symbols, S
is the successor function symbol, 0 is a constant symbol, and m is the term
S m 0. In K, the knowledge bases at x and z are infinite sets of sentences, one
for each m. The signature network S is not report complete at the decider
d, but the knowledge base network K is report complete at d. The sentence
A(100) is 101-pass report provable but not 100-pass report provable at d in
K. Using n instead of 100, we see that for any n, K is not n-pass report
complete at d.
S is not report complete. To see this, let K0 be the knowledge base over
S with K0 (x) = {∀t(A(t) → B(t))}, K0 (z) = {∀t(B(t) → A(St))}, and with
the other knowledge bases being {>}. Then K0 (V ) ` ∀t(A(t) → A(St)) but
∀t(A(t) → A(St)) is not report provable at d in K0 .
We now show that report provability lives up to its name.
Proposition 4.8. In a knowledge base network K, a sentence D is report
provable at a decider d if an only if there exists a report proof of D at d.
Proof. Remark 4.2 gives one direction. For the other direction, we first prove
the following by induction on m:
In K, if a sentence C is m-reportable along an edge (x, y), then for any
decider d there is a report proof of > at d that contains the triple (x, y, C).
By definition, if C is 0-reportable along (x, y) then (x, y, C)(d, d, >) is
a report proof. Assume the result holds for m and suppose C is (m + 1)reportable along (x, y). This means that C ∈ [L(x)∩L(y)] and K(x)∪R ` C
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where R is a set of sentences that are m-reportable to x. By the inductive
hypothesis, for each B ∈ R there is a child z of x and a report proof RB of
> at d containing (z, x, B). By removing the last deciding step from each
RB , stringing them together in any order, and adding (x, y, C)(d, d, >) at
the end, we obtain a report proof containing (x, y, C). This completes the
induction.
If D is report provable at d, then D ∈ [L(d)] and D is provable from K(d)
and sentences reportable to d. Arguing as in the preceding paragraph, we
then obtain a report proof of D at d.

The next result is an improvement of Corollary 3.5. It could be proved
by an easy modification of the proof of Fact 3.4, but we will instead prove
it as a consequence of Fact 3.4.
Proposition 4.9. Every signature network S that contains a signature tree
T with decider d is single-pass report complete at d.
Proof. Let K be a knowledge base over S, A ∈ [L(d)], and K(V ) ` A. By
Fact 3.4, T is report complete at d, so A is report provable at d in KT . By
Proposition 4.8, A has a report proof R at d in KT . Since T is a tree, the set
V of agents can be put in a list (u1 , . . . , un ) such that un = d, and whenever
there is a path from ui to uj in T we have i ≤ j. The steps in R can be
rearranged into a sequence R0 so that all the steps with reporter u1 come
first, then all the steps with reporter u2 , and so on, ending with the deciding
step (d, d, A). Since i ≤ j whenever there is a path from ui to uj in T, R0 is
still a report proof in KT at d. Now combine the steps along each edge into
a single step by taking the conjunction of the reported sentences. This gives
us a single-pass report proof R00 of A at d in KT . R00 is also a single-pass
report proof of A at d in K, as required.

5. Observation Networks
An observation network is a signature network where each agent has both
a knowledge base and a set of sentences called potential observations.
The story: An organization has a finite set of agents arranged in a network
indexed by a graph, with a decider d. Each agent x has a signature L(x) and
a knowledge base K(x) ⊆ [L(x)]. Each agent x also has a set of potential
observations O(x) ⊆ [L(x)], and the decider d has a set A ⊆ [L(d)] of
alternatives. In informal discussions in this paper, we will use the word
“scenario” to mean a possible state of the world at the time that the agents
make their observations. The organization is faced with a recurring situation
where in every scenario, each agent x makes observations in O(x), and there
is an alternative A ∈ A that is “correct” in the sense that it is provable from
the combined knowledge base and the observations of the agents.
In Theorem 5.6 below we will use the Compactness Theorem to show
that there must be a finite subset A0 ⊆ A and, for each agent x ∈ V , a
finite set O0 (x) ⊆ O(x), such that in every scenario, each agent x makes
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one observation in O0 (x), and some alternative A ∈ A0 is correct. We first
formally state the definitions.
We say that a set B of sentences is closed under finite conjunctions
V if
> ∈ B and for each non-empty finite subset B0 ⊆ B, the conjunction B0
is logically equivalent to some sentence in B.
Remark 5.1.
• If > ∈ B, and for each A, B ∈ B there exists C ∈ B that is logically
equivalent to A ∧ B, then B is closed under finite conjunctions.
• If B is closed under finite conjunctions and B0 ⊆ B is finite, then
there is a finite set B1 such that B0 ⊆ B1 ⊆ B and B1 is closed
under finite conjunctions.
Definition 5.2. Given a knowledge base network
K = (V, E, L(·), K(·)),
an observation network (over K) is an object
O = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O(·))
consisting of K and a labeling O(·) of (V, E) such that for each agent x in
V , O(x) ⊆ [L(x)], and O(x) is closed under finite conjunctions.
The elements
of O(x) are called potential observations
S
S for x. We write
L(V ) = x∈V L(x) for the combined signature,
K(V
)
=
x∈V K(x) for the
S
combined knowledge base, and O(V ) = x∈V O(x) for the combined set of
potential observations.
Definition 5.3. A finite observation network is an observation network
O0 = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O0 (·))
such that the combined set of potential observations O0 (V ) is finite.
Given an observation network
O = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O(·)),
a finite part of O is a finite observation network
O0 = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O0 (·))
over the same knowledge base network such that O0 (x) ⊆ O(x) for every
agent x ∈ V .
Definition 5.4. By a set of alternatives for an observation network O
O = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O(·))
we will mean a non-empty set of sentences in [L(V )]. O is sufficient for a
set of alternatives A if for every complete extension M of K(V ), there exists
an alternative AM ∈ A such that
K(V ) ∪ (M ∩ O(V )) ` AM .
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Definition 5.5. By an observation in O we mean a function O(·) such
that O(x)
V ∈ O(x) for each agent x ∈ V . We will write O(V ) for the sentence x∈V O(x). An observation O(·) in O is called consistent if O(V ) is
consistent with K(V ).
For each observation O(·) in O, let KO (x) = K(x) ∪ {O(x)} and form the
knowledge base network
KO = (V, E, L(·), KO (·))
by adding the sentence O(x) to the knowledge base K(x) for each x ∈ V .
The following result is an application of the Compactness Theorem.
Theorem 5.6. Let
O = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O(·))
be an observation network, and let A be a set of alternatives for O. Then
the following are equivalent:
(i) O is sufficient for A;
(ii) there exists a finite set A0 ⊆ A and a finite part O0 of O such that
O0 is sufficient for A0 .
(iii) there are finitely many observations O1 (·), . . . , On (·) in O and finitely
many alternatives A1 , . . . , An in A such that:
(1)

K(V ) ` O1 (V ) ∨ · · · ∨ On (V );

(2)

for each k ≤ n, K(V ) ` Ok (V ) → Ak .

Discussion: In this result, all that matters is the combined knowledge
base K(V ) and observation set O(V ). The knowledge bases and observations of the individual agents will play a role later on in this paper. The
formal counterpart of a possible scenario is a complete extension M of the
combined knowledge base K(V ). So Condition (i) says that in every possible
scenario, some alternative A ∈ A can be proved from the combined knowledge bases and the observations of the agents. Condition (ii) says that there
are predetermined finite sets of observations O0 (V ) and of alternatives A0
such that in every possible scenario, some alternative in A0 can be proved
from the combined knowledge bases and the observations of the agents in
O0 (V ).
Condition (iii) gives a characterization of sufficiency that does not mention
complete extensions. (1) says that in every scenario, one of the observations
Om (·) will be made. (2) says that the alternative Am can be proved from
the combined knowledge base and the observations Om (x), x ∈ V . Note that
in (iii), one can remove any inconsistent observations Om (·), so each of the
observations Om (·) can be taken to be consistent.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. (iii) ⇒ (i): Assume (iii). Let M be a complete extension of K(V ). By (1), M ` Ok (V ) for some k ≤ n, so by (2) we have
M ` Ak . Since Ak ∈ A, this proves (i).
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(i) ⇒ (ii): Assume (i). By (i), for each complete extension M of K(V )
there is an alternative AM ∈ A such that
K(V ) ∪ (M ∩ O(V )) ` AM .
By the Compactness Theorem, for each complete extension M of K(V ),
there is a finite set OM ⊆ (M ∩ O(V )) such that
K(V ) ∪ OM ` AM .
By the Compactness Theorem again, every consistent set of sentences in
L(V ) has at least one complete extension. The set of sentences
^
K(V ) ∪ {¬ OM : M is a complete extension of K(V )}
does not have a complete extension, and hence is not consistent. By the
Compactness Theorem yet again, this set has a finite subset that is inconsistent. Therefore there are complete extensions M1 , . . . , Mn of K(V ) such
that
K(V ) ∪ {¬O1 , . . . , ¬On }
V
is inconsistent, where Oi = OMi . Then
K(V ) ` O1 ∨ · · · ∨ On .
Let
A0 = {AM1 , · · · , AMn }.
Then A0 is a finite subset of A. By Remark 5.1, for each agent x ∈ V there
is a finite set of sentences O0 (x) such that
O(x) ⊇ O0 (x) ⊇ O(x) ∩ (OM1 ∪ · · · ∪ OMn ),
and O0 (x) is closed under finite conjunctions. Then
O0 = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O0 (·))
is a finite part of O. For each complete extension N of K(V ) we have N ` Ok
for some k ≤ n, and therefore
(K(V ) ∪ OMk ) ⊆ (N ∩ O0 (V )).
We have K(V ) ` Ok → AMi , so K(V ) ∪ OMk ` AMk . It follows that
(N ∩ O0 (V )) ` AMk
and AMk ∈ A0 . Then O0 is sufficient for A0 , and (ii) is proved.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Assume (ii). Since O0 (V ) is finite, there are finitely many
subsets P1 , . . . , Pn of O0 (V ) such that:
(a) For every complete extension M of K(V ), M∩O0 (V ) ∈ {P1 , . . . , Pn };
(b) for each k ≤ n, there is a complete extension Mk of K(V ) such that
Mk ∩ O0 (V ) = Pk .
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For each k ≤ nVand x ∈ V , let Ok (x) be a sentence in O(x) that is logically
V
equivalent to (Pk ∩ O0 (x)). Then Ok (V ) is logically equivalent to Pk .
Condition (1) follows easily from (a). By (b), each Ok (·) is a consistent
observation in O. By (ii), O0 is sufficient for A0 , so by (b), for each k ≤ n
there exists Ak ∈ A0 such that
K(V ) ∪ (Mk ∩ O0 (V )) = K(V ) ∪ Pk ` Ak ,
and (2) follows. This proves (iii).



6. Report Plans
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on what happens when information
is passed between neighboring agents in an observation network. In this
section we will formally define the notion of a report plan. The intuitive
idea of a report plan and a simple example were given in the Preview to this
paper.
Suppose S is a signature network. Then for every observation network
O = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O(·))
over S and every observation O(·) in O, KO is a knowledge base network
over S. In this way, each observation network over S gives rise to a whole
family of knowledge base networks over S. So if S is report complete, then
for every knowledge base network KO in this family, every sentence that is
provable from the combined knowledge base is report provable.
By a set of alternatives at d we mean a non-empty set of sentences in
[L(d)]. The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.6
Corollary 6.1. Let
O = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O(·))
be an observation network over a signature network S that is report complete
at d. Let A ⊆ [L(d)] be a set of alternatives at a decider d. Suppose that O is
sufficient for A. Then there are finitely many observations O1 (·), . . . , On (·)
in O and finitely many alternatives A1 , . . . , An in A such that:
(a) K(V ) ` (O1 (V ) ∨ · · · ∨ On (V ));
(b) for each k ≤ n, Ak is report provable in KOk at d.
This corollary shows that there is a predetermined finite set of observations Ok (·) and alternatives Ak , k ≤ m, such that in every scenario,
• one of the observations Ok (·) will be made;
• the alternative Ak will be correct in the sense that it is provable from
K(V ) ∪ Ok (V );
• reports between neighboring agents will propagate through the network, and then the decider will be able to prove the alternative Ak
from its knowledge base and the sentences that are reported to it.
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A set of sentences B is called Boolean closed if B is closed under finite
conjunctions, and for any B ∈ B the negation ¬B is logically equivalent to a
sentence in B. An observation network O is called Boolean closed if O(x)
is Boolean closed for every agent x ∈ V .
In the case that the observation network is Boolean closed and its signature network contains a signature tree with decider d, one can improve
upon Corollary 6.1. We will show that in that case there must be a finite
plan, called a report plan, that will always enable the decider to arrive at
a correct alternative. For each agent x and edge (x, y), a report plan will
provide x with a finite rule that gives a sentence C to report along (x, y),
where C depends only on the observation by x and the reports received by
x. For any potential observations by the agents, the report plan will produce
a single-pass report proof of one of the alternatives.
A finite set of sentences {C1 , . . . , Cn } is a partition if each sentence
alone is logically consistent, the sentences are mutually exclusive, and their
disjunction is logically valid, that is,
Ci 6` ⊥ for each i,

` ¬(Ci ∧ Cj ) whenever i < j, and ` C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn .

Definition 6.2. Let O be an observation network and A be a set of alternatives at a decider d. A report plan for (O, A, d) is an object
P = (O0 (·), C0 (·), A0 )
such that:
(1) for each agent x ∈ V , O0 (x) ⊆ O(x) and O0 (x) is a partition;
(2) for each edge (x, y) ∈ E, C0 (x, y) is a finite set of sentences in the
common language [L(x) ∩ L(y)],
(3) A0 is a finite subset of A;
(4) by a potential report (to x) we mean a set R(x) of sentences consisting of one element of C0 (z, x) for each edge (z, x) (R(x) is empty
if x is a source);
(5) for each edge (x, y) ∈ E, observation O(x) ∈ O0 (x), and potential report R(x), there is a sentence C ∈ C0 (x, y) such that K(x)∪{O(x)}∪
R(x) ` C;
(6) for each observation O(d) ∈ O0 (d) and potential report R(d), there
is a sentence A ∈ A0 such that K(d) ∪ {O(d)} ∪ R(d) ` A;
(7) P avoids cycles, that is, every directed cycle contains an edge e
such that C0 (e) = {>}.
By an observation in P we mean an observation O(·) in O such that
O(x) ∈ O0 (x) for each agent x. By a report proof in P from an observation
O(·) in P we mean a single-pass report proof R in KO such that C ∈ C0 (x, y)
for each triple (x, y, C) ∈ R.
Remark 6.3. Let P be a report plan for (O, A, d). Then for each complete
extension M of K(V ) there is a unique observation OP,M (·) in P such that
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Figure 7. Checklist for agent x.
M ` OP,M (V ). This follows from the fact that each set O0 (x) in a report
plan is a partition.
The story: Intuitively, a report plan provides each agent x with a checklist
consisting of a finite partition O0 (x) of potential observations, and finite sets
of sentences C0 (z, x) and C0 (x, y) for each child z of x and each parent y of
x (see Figure ??). From the point of view of agent x, C0 (z, x) is a finite set
of “question sentences” to watch for, and C0 (x, y) is a finite set of “answer
sentences” to try to prove. (Thus for each edge (x, y), C0 (x, y) is both a set
of questions asked by y and a set of possible answers by x). The decider d
is also provided with a finite set of alternatives A0 . Meaningful reports can
only be passed along edges (x, y) such that C0 (x, y) 6= {>}.
Remark 6.3 says that in each scenario M, every agent x makes exactly
one observation OP,M (x) ∈ O0 (x). Each agent x asks each of its children z
the finite set of questions C0 (z, x) and receives an answer in this set. These
answers together form one of the potential reports R(x) to x, which we will
call the report received by x. Then for each parent y of x, agent x proves one
of the sentences in C0 (x, y) from its knowledge base K(x), its observation
OP,M (x), and the report R(x) it receives, and reports this sentence as its
answer to y. Finally, the decider d receives a report R(d) from its children
and proves an alternative in A0 from its knowledge base K(d), its observation
OM (d), and R(d).
Using the fact that the report plan avoids cycles, we will see that this process will always provide a single-pass report proof of one of the alternatives.
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In this process, each agent x selects an answer sentence C(x, y) ∈ C0 (x, y)
for each edge (x, y), and the decider d selects an alternative A ∈ A. To do its
part, each agent x only needs its own knowledge base K(x) and observation
OP,M (x), and the sets of sentences C0 (z, x) for each child z and C0 (x, y) for
each parent y. The agents do not need to know the observations or question sentences of the other agents. This process is a particular realization
of the report plan where each agent makes an observation, receives a single
potential report from its children, and proves one of finitely many possible
answers to report to each of its parents.
What does a report plan look like? We have already seen an example
of a report plan P in the Preview at the beginning of this paper (Figure 1,
revisited in Example 4.3). Let us take a closer look.
Example 6.4. The observation network shown in Figure 1 is Boolean closed
(provided that we put O(d) = {>, ⊥} instead of O(d) = {>}). The lower left
diagram shows a report plan P. The lower right diagram shows the report
proof
R = (y, w, B → C)(z, w, C → ¬E)(w, d, ¬E)(x, d, A ↔ E)(d, d, ¬A)
in P of ¬A at d from the observation O, where
O(y) = Y,

O(z) = ¬Z,

O(w) = W,

O(x) = X,

O(d) = >.

Let us examine this report plan from the viewpoint of agent w. Agent w
has signature, knowledge base, and potential observations
L(w) = {W, B, C, D, E},

K(w) = {W → B, ¬W → E},

O(w) = {W, ¬W }.

In the report plan P, w’s checklist consists of the sets of potential observations O(w), question sentences
C0 (y, w) = {B → C, B → D},

C0 (z, w) = {C → E, C → ¬E},

and possible answers
C0 (w, d) = {D, E, ¬E}.
To verify that P actually is a report plan, the non-trivial things to check
are Conditions (5) and (6) in Definition 6.2. For instance, Condition (5) for
the edge (w, d) says that for each of the two potential observations for w
and four potential reports to w, some sentence in C0 (w, d) is deducible from
w’s knowledge base and observation and the potential report. So there are
eight things to verify for the edge (w, d). Here are two of them.
{W → B, ¬W → E} ∪ {W } ∪ {B → C, C → E} ` E,
{W → B, ¬W → E} ∪ {W } ∪ {B → C, C → ¬E} ` ¬E.
Why do we require that a report plan avoids cycles? A key requirement
for a report plan is that for every observation O(·) in P, some alternative
A ∈ A0 has a report proof in P (Theorem 7.1 ). The following example gives
an object P that does not do this, but satisfies all the requirements for a
report plan except avoiding cycles.
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Figure 8. Example 6.5
Example 6.5. In Figure 8, the agent d is the unique decider in the signature
network S. Using an argument like the proof of Example 4.4, one can see
that S is two-pass report complete but not single-pass report complete at d.
Now let O be the Boolean closed observation network over K where O(x) =
{>, ⊥} for each agent x. Let P = (O0 (·), C0 (·), A0 ) be the object shown at
the right in Figure 8. P assigns the observation O0 (x) = {>} to every agent
x, has the single alternative A0 = {B}, and has C0 (z, x) = {A ∧ B} and
C0 (·) = {B} elsewhere. The only observation in P is the function O(x) = >,
and the combined knowledge base for KO is KO (V ) = {A}. P satisfies all
the requirements for being a report plan for (O, A0 , d) except for avoiding
cycles. The sentence B is two-pass report provable at d in KO , but B does
not have a report proof in P, because none of the agents in the triangle can
report anything before it receives a report from another agent.
The remark below says that being a report plan is preserved under adding
new sentences to the knowledge bases, new potential observations, or new
alternatives.
Remark 6.6. Suppose P is a report plan for (O, A, d). Let
O0 = (V, E, L(·), K0 (·), O0 (·))
be an observation network over the same S such that K(x) ⊆ K0 (x) and
O(x) ⊆ O0 (x) for each agent x ∈ V . Also suppose that A ⊆ A0 ⊆ [L(d)].
Then P is still a report plan for (O0 , A0 , d).
7. Main Results
In this section we prove two theorems about report plans. Theorem 7.1
will show that a report plan guarantees that for every observation, some alternative is single-pass report provable from the observation and the knowledge bases. The proof of Theorem 7.1 will describe how a report plan P can
be executed after each each agent x makes an observation. Theorem 7.3 will
show that if the signature network S contains a signature tree with decider
d, then every Boolean closed observation network over S that is sufficient
for the set of alternatives has a report plan at d.
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Theorem 7.1. Let O be an observation network with decider d, and let P =
(O0 (·), C0 (·), A0 ) be a report plan for (O, A, d). Then for every observation
O(·) in P there exists an alternative A ∈ A0 and a report proof in P of A at
d from O(·).
Proof. Let F be the set of all edges (x, y) ∈ E such that C0 (x, y) 6= {>}. Let
U be the set consisting of d and all agents x ∈ V such that (V, F ) contains
a path from x to d. Let G = F ∩ (U × U ). Note that if y ∈ U and (x, y) ∈ F
then x ∈ U and (x, y) ∈ G. Define the height h(x) of an agent x ∈ U to be
the length of the longest path in (U, G) that ends in x, with the convention
that h(x) = 0 if G contains no edge of the form (z, x). Since R avoids cycles,
(U, G) contains no directed cycles. Hence each path in (U, G) has length at
most |U |. Therefore each agent in U has finite height. (U, G) contains a
path from every agent x ∈ U to d, so d has the greatest height. The set
G ∪ {(d, d)} can be arranged in a list (u1 , v1 )(u2 , v2 ), . . . , (un , vn ) such that:
• un = vn = d;
• if i < j ≤ n then h(ui ) ≤ h(uj );
• for each x ∈ U , the i’s such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ui = x are consecutive.
Since P is a report plan, we can choose sentences Ci ∈ C0 (ui , vi ) such that
for each i < n, if Ri = {Cj : j < i, vj = ui } is a potential report to ui
then K(ui ) ∪ {O(ui )} ∪ Ri ` Ci . It then follows by induction that for each
i < n, Ri is a potential report to ui . Moreover, Rn = {Cj : j < n, vj =
d} is a potential report to d, and there is a sentence A ∈ A0 such that
K(d) ∪ {O(d)} ∪ Rn ` A. This shows that
R = (u1 , v1 , C1 )(u2 , v2 , C2 ) · · · (un−1 vn−1 Cn−1 )(d, d, A)
is a single-pass report proof in KO of A at d from O(·). Since Ci ∈ C0 (ui , vi )
for each i and A ∈ A0 , R is a report proof in P.

Definition 7.2. We say that an observation network O is plan complete at
a decider d if for every set of sentences A ⊆ [L(d)] for which O is sufficient,
there exists a report plan for (O, A, d). A signature network S is plan
complete at d if every Boolean closed observation network O over S is plan
complete at d.
Theorem 7.3. If a signature network S contains a signature tree T =
(V, F, L(·)) with decider d, then S is plan complete at decider d.
The proof will show a bit more: For each Boolean closed observation
network O over S and A ⊆ [L(d)] there is report plan P for (O, A, d) such
that C0 (x, y) = {>} whenever (x, y) ∈ E \ F . Intuitively, this means that
each agent reports only to its unique parent in the tree (V, F ).
Proof of Theorem 7.3. Let A ⊆ [L(d)]. Note that if we are able to get a
report plan for (O0 , A, d) where O0 is the observation network
O0 = (V, F, L(·), K(·), O(·))
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formed by replacing E by F and leaving everything else unchanged, then we
at once get a report plan for (O, A, d) by putting C0 (x, y) = {>} for each
edge (x, y) ∈ E \ F . We may therefore assume without loss of generality
that S is already a signature tree, so that E = F .
Since (V, E) is a tree, each agent x 6= d has a unique parent y = p(x),
and d has no parents. Moreover, (V, E) has no directed cycles. By Fact 3.4,
S is report complete at d. Then by Corollary 6.1, there are finitely many
observations O1 (·), . . . , On (·) in O and finitely many alternatives A1 , . . . , An
in A such that conditions 6.1 (a) and (b) hold. Let A0 = {A1 , . . . , An }.
For each agent x ∈ V , let O0 (x) be the set of all logically consistent
sentences of the form P1 (x) ∧ · · · ∧ Pn (x) where for each k ≤ n, Pk (x) ∈
{Ok (x), ¬Ok (x)}. It is clear that each O0 (x) is a finite partition. Since O is
Boolean closed, we have O0 (x) ⊆ O(x) for each x.
We are going to build sets of question sentences C0 (x, y) for each (x, y) ∈ E
such that P = (O0 (·), C0 (·), A0 ) is a report plan for (O, A, d). For now, we
let P− be the pair (O0 (·), A0 ), and say that O(·) is an observation in P− if
O(x) ∈ O0 (x) for each xV∈ V . Consider an observation O(·) in P− . Recall
that we write O(V ) for x∈V O(x). Since each set O0 (x) is a partition, for
each k ≤ n, O(V ) is either equal to Ok (V ) or is inconsistent with Ok (V ).
By 6.1 (a), we have
K(V ) ` (O1 (V ) ∨ · · · ∨ On (V )).
So if O(V ) is not one of O1 (V ), . . . , On (V ), then O(V ) is not consistent with
K(V ), and hence every sentence is provable from K(V ) and O(V ). So in
every case there exists k ≤ n such that
K(V ) ` O(V ) → Ok (V ),
and hence
KO (V ) ` Ok (V ).
By 6.1 (b), Ak is report provable in KOk at d, so Ak is provable from KO (V ).
We let AO = Ak and note that AO ∈ A0 .
By Proposition 4.9, for each observation O(·) in P− , KO is single-pass report complete at d, so we may choose a single-pass report proof of AO at d in
KO . For each edge (x, y) ∈ E, let B O (x, y) be the unique sentence reported
along (x, y) in this proof if there is one, and otherwise let B O (x, y) = >.
Then for each (x, y) ∈ E we have:
• B O (x, y) ∈ [L(x) ∩ L(y)];
• K(x) ∪ {O(x)} ∪ {B O (z, x) : (z, x) ∈ E} ` B O (x, y);
• K(d) ∪ {O(d)} ∪ {B O (z, d) : (z, d) ∈ E} ` AO .
For each edge (x, y) ∈ E, let
D0 (x, y) = {B O (x, y) : O(·) is an observation in P− }.
We write x ≤ y if there is a path from x to y in (V, E), and write x < y
if x ≤ y and x 6= y. As before, the height of y is the length of the longest
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path ending in y. Note that if x < y then the height of x is less than the
height of y.
Now, for each observation O(·) in P− , define the sentences DO (x, y),
(x, y) ∈ E, inductively on the height of x in the tree (V, E) as follows:
DO (x, y) is the conjunction of all sentences in D0 (x, y) that are provable
from
K(x) ∪ {O(x)} ∪ {DO (z, x) : (z, x) ∈ E}.
Finally, for each edge (x, y) ∈ E we define
C0 (x, y) = {DO (x, y) : O(·) is an observation in P− }.
Since there are finitely many observations in P− , D0 (x, y) and C0 (x, y) are
finite subsets of [L(x) ∩ L(y)] for each edge (x, y) ∈ E. We let
P = (O0 (·), C0 (·), A0 ),
and will show that P is a report plan for (O, A, d). Note that the observations
in P are just the observations in P− .
Consider an arbitrary agent x ∈ V and let B ∈ O0 (x). An argument by
induction on the height of z in (V, E) shows that for each edge (z, y) ∈ E, the
sentences DO (z, y) depend only on the observations O(u) such that u ≤ z.
Let {z1 , . . . , zm } be the set of all children of x in (V, E), and let R(x) be a
potential report to x in P. Then R(x) has the form
R(x) = {D1 , . . . , Dm }
where each Dj is the conjunction of one or more sentences in C0 (zj , x). Then
for each j ≤ m there is an observation Oj (·) in P such that the sentence
DOj (zj , x) occurs in the conjunction Dj .
Since (V, E) is a tree, for any distinct i, j ≤ m, the sets {u : u ≤ zi }
and {u : u ≤ zj } are disjoint. Therefore there is an observation O(·) in P
such that O(u) = Oj (u) for each j ≤ m and agent u ≤ zj , and O(x) = B.
Then for each j ≤ m we have DO (zj , x) = DOj (zj , x), so R(x) ` DO (z, x)
whenever (z, x) ∈ E.
Whenever (x, y) ∈ E, DO (x, y) is a conjunction of sentences that are
provable from K(x) ∪ {O(x)} ∪ R(x), so
K(x) ∪ {O(x)} ∪ R(x) ` DO (x, y).
By the definition of C0 (x, y) we have DO (x, y) ∈ C0 (x, y).
In the case x = d, we have R(d) ` DO (z, d) whenever (z, d) ∈ E. By
induction on height, for each observation O(·) in P and edge (z, y) ∈ E, we
have DO (z, y) ` B O (z, y). Then R(d) ` B O (z, d) whenever (z, d) ∈ E. We
recall that
K(d) ∪ {O(d)} ∪ {B O (z, d) : (z, d) ∈ E} ` AO .
Therefore
K(d) ∪ {O(d)} ∪ R(d) ` AO .
This completes the proof that P is a report plan for (O, A, d), and hence
that O is plan complete at d.
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8. Special Cases
8.1. Minimal Observation Networks. What do the theorems in Section
7 tell us if we just have a knowledge base network instead of an observation
network? In other words, what do they tell us when the agents do not learn
(or only observe the true sentence >)? To answer this, we note that every
knowledge base network
K = (V, E, L(·), K(·))
can be made into a finite Boolean closed observation network
O = (V, E, L(·), K(·), O(·))
by putting O(x) = {>, ⊥} for each agent x. We call O the minimal
observation network over K. In the minimal observation network over
K, in any scenario every agent will observe the true sentence >, because
O(V ) = {>, ⊥}, and for every complete extension M of K(V ), we have
M ∩ O(V ) = {>}. Therefore, the minimal observation network O over K is
sufficient for a set of alternatives A if and only if K(V ) ` A for some A ∈ A.
Proposition 8.1. Suppose that O is a minimal observation network, and
P = (O0 (·), C0 (·), A0 ) is a report plan for (O, A, d). Then O0 (x) = {>} for
each agent x ∈ V , and there exists an alternative A ∈ A0 and elements
C(x, y) ∈ C0 (x, y), (x, y) ∈ E, such that the triple
P0 = (O0 (·), C00 (·), A00 ),

C00 (x, y) = {C(x, y)},

A00 = {A}

is a report plan for (O, A, d).
Proof. We first note that the only partition contained in O(V ) is {>}, so
O0 (x) = {>} for each x ∈ V . Then the only observation in P is the function
O(x) = >. By Theorem 7.1, there is a single-pass report proof R in P of a
sentence A ∈ A0 at d from O(·). Each edge (x, y) occurs at most once in
R. If R contains the triple (x, y, B), put C(x, y) = B, and otherwise put
C(x, y) = >. Then C(x, y) ∈ C0 (x, y) for each edge, and P0 satisfies all the
requirements for a report plan for (O, A, d).

We now use a minimal observation network to show that plan completeness implies single-pass report completeness for signature networks.
Proposition 8.2. If a signature network S is plan complete at d, then S is
single-pass report complete at d.
Proof. Suppose S is plan complete at d, and let K be a knowledge base
network K over S. Assume that D ∈ [L(d)] and D is provable from K(V ).
Let O be the minimal observation network over K. Then O is plan complete
at d. Since K(V ) ` D, D holds in every complete extension M of K(V ), and
hence O is sufficient for D at d. By the plan completeness of S at d, there
exists a report plan for (O, {D}, d). Then by Theorem 7.1, D is single-pass
report provable in K at d, so S is single-pass report complete at d.
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8.2. Fragments of First Order Logic. As pointed out in the Prerequisites, all our results hold for propositional logic as well as first order logic.
In particular, Theorem 7.3 holds for propositional logic.
Corollary 8.3. Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 7.3. If each sentence in
the combined knowledge base K(V ), the combined set of potential observations O(V ), and the set of alternatives A is a sentence in propositional logic,
then there is a report plan P composed entirely of sentences in propositional
logic.
Similarly, all the results of [7] and hence Theorem 7.3 hold for the fragment
of first order logic without quantifiers. A first order sentence is said to be
quantifier-free if it has no quantifiers.
Corollary 8.4. Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 7.3. If each sentence in
the combined knowledge base K(V ), the combined set of potential observations O(V ), and the set of alternatives A is quantifier-free, then there is a
report plan P composed entirely of quantifier-free sentences.
8.3. Approximate Values. In many situations, there is a need to determine an approximate value of one or more unknown quantities. We briefly
indicate how report plans might be used to approximate one unknown quantity. The idea can easily be generalized to the case of finitely many unknown
quantities.
Suppose O is an observation network in which the signature L(d) of the
decider has at least the symbols +, −, ≤, a constant symbol for each rational
number, and one extra constant symbol c for an “unknown quantity”. Suppose the knowledge base K(d) has at least the axioms for an ordered abelian
group and all true equations and inequalities involving rational numbers. We
allow the possibility that L(d) also has other symbols and K(d) has additional sentences, and make no restrictions about the other agents. We let Q
denote the set of rational numbers. For each positive rational number r, let
A(r) be the set of sentences
{q ≤ c ∧ c ≤ q + r : q ∈ Q}.
Each sentence in A(r) says that c belongs to a closed interval of length r
with rational endpoints.
Theorem 7.3 tells us that if O is Boolean closed, contains a signature tree
with decider d, and is sufficient for A(r), then there exists a report plan P
for (O, A(r), d).
If P = (O0 (·), C0 (·), A0 ) is a report plan for (O, A(r), d), and O(x) ∈ O0 (x)
for each agent x, then Theorem 7.1 tells us that some sentence A ∈ A0 is
report provable in the knowledge base network KO . This sentence A belongs
to A(r), so it approximates the unknown value c within r.
Now let r0 , r1 , . . . be a sequence of positive rational numbers that converges to 0, and consider a sequence of report plans Pn for (O, A(rn ), d). In
each scenario, the sequence of report plans will produce a sequence of better
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and better approximations of the unknown quantity c. The following corollary to Theorem 7.1 shows that in every scenario, the sequence of report
plans produces a unique real value for the unknown constant c.
Proposition 8.5. Suppose that r0 , r1 , . . . is a sequence of positive rational
numbers that converges to 0, and that for each n, Pn = (On0 (·), Cn0 (·), An0 ) is
a report plan for (O, A(rn ), d). Let M be a complete extension of K(V ) and
n
let On (·) = OP ,M (·) be the unique observation given in Remark 6.3. Then
the real number
s = sup{q ∈ Q : M ` q ≤ c}
exists and for each n, s belongs to an interval [qn , qn +rn ] where the sentence
qn ≤ c ∧ c ≤ qn + rn
n

belongs to An0 and is report provable in KO .
Proof. By Theorem 7.1, for each n there is a rational qn such that the
sentence An = (qn ≤ c ∧ c ≤ qn + rn ) belongs to An0 and is report provable
n
in KO . By Fact 3.2, An is provable from the combined knowledge base
n
KO (V ). But K(V ) ⊆ M and M ` On (x) for each n and x. Therefore
M ` An for each n.
Since M is consistent and contains the axioms for ordered abelian groups
with constants for each rational, the set
{q ∈ Q : M ` q ≤ c}
contains q1 and is bounded above by q1 + r1 + 1. Therefore the supremum
of this set exists and is a real number s. Moreover, s belongs to the interval
[qn , qn + rn ] for each n, as required.

9. Some Open Questions
In this section we pose some questions that were left open in this paper.
Example 4.7 gives a report complete knowledge base network K that is not
n-pass report complete for any n. The analogous question for signature
networks is open.
Question 9.1. Suppose S is a report complete signature network. Is there
a finite n such that S is n-pass report complete?
Our next open question is a possible converse to Theorem 7.3.
Question 9.2. Let S be a signature network that is plan complete at a
decider d. Must S contain a signature tree with decider d?
The following corollary gives two cases where the above question has an
affirmative answer.
Corollary 9.3. Let S be a signature network that is either over a directed
acyclic graph or a connected symmetric graph. If S is plan complete at d
then S contains a signature tree with decider d.
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Proof. By Proposition 8.2 and Facts 3.6 and 3.8.



Here is another open question.
Question 9.4. Let S be a signature network and d a decider. Suppose that
every minimal observation network O over S is plan complete. Must every
Boolean closed observation network over S also be plan complete?
Remark 9.5. The following are equivalent:
(a) The answers to Questions 9.2 and 9.4 are both “yes”;
(b) If every minimal observation network over signature network S is
plan complete at d, then S contains a signature tree with decider d.
Our last open question is a possible converse to Proposition 8.2.
Question 9.6. If a signature network is single-pass report complete at a
decider d, must it be plan complete at d?

10. Conclusion
This paper and the paper [7] provide a “report theory” for analyzing
situations of the following kind: Agents make inferences based on the information they have, and report them other agents in order to make decisions.
Such reporting is natural when decentralized information in a network is
to be incorporated by an agent who is faced with a decision. We provide
conditions under which reporting can lead to correct decisions. These conditions involve signatures, knowledge bases, and potential observations of
the agents, the way the agents are connected in a network, and the alternatives to be decided. Future work might involve evaluating and designing
knowledge bases and networks tailored to specific applications.
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